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Abstract 
This paper offers a simple but powerful model of wishful thinking, cognitive dissonance, and 
related  biases.  Choices  maximize  subjective  expected  utility,  but  beliefs  depend  on  the 
decision maker's interests as well as on relevant information. Simplifying assumptions yield a 
representation in which the payoff in an event affects beliefs as if it were part of the evidence 
about its likelihood. A single parameter determines both the direction and weight of this 
`evidence', with positive values corresponding to optimism and negative values to pessimism. 
Changes to a person's interests amount to new `evidence', and can alter beliefs even in the 
absence  of  new  information.  The  magnitude  of  the  bias  increases  with  the  degree  of 
uncertainty and the strength of the decision maker's interests. High stakes can reduce the bias 
indirectly by increasing incentives to acquire information, but are otherwise consistent with 
substantial bias. Exploring applications, I show that wishful thinking can lead investors to 
become progressively more exposed to risk, and that while improved policing unambiguously 
deters crime, increased punishment may have little or no deterrent value.  
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 G. Mayraz, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
Beliefs depend not only on what people know to be true, but also on what they
want to be true. This paper introduces a model of decision making that allows for
this possibility, and uses a number of simplifying assumptions to obtain a tractable
and generally applicable representation. The model provides a unied account of
wishful thinking, overoptimism, overcondence, cognitive dissonance, and unrealistic
pessimism, and can be used to study their implications for decision making. The
psychology evidence for these biases spans decades. The economics evidence is much
less extensive, but includes a wide variety of situations.1 Theoretical applications
extend into additional areas.2
This paper is hardly the rst to oer a model of these biases, but it diers markedly
from the previous literature. The common approach is to model biased beliefs as an
optimal delusion: decision makers start the planning horizon with unbiased beliefs,
and choose a distorted prior so as to maximize their total discounted utility, including
utility from anticipation (Akerlof and Dickens, 1982; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005).3
Optimal delusion models can plausibly explain many cases of optimistic bias. For
example, a moderate bias over health risks can be seen as a trade-o between the desire
to minimize fear and the possibility that biased beliefs would result in behavior that
would make disease more likely. A moderate level of bias is, however, predicated on
relevant choices having correspondingly moderate stakes. In the limit of low stakes the
bias is extreme, and in the limit of high stakes it disappears entirely. By assumption, it
is not possible to model situations in which the bias leads to welfare loss in expectation.
Optimism in such models is related to risk and ambiguity preferences. Since riskier
1 Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) nd that parties in negotiations are aected by wishful thinking,
resulting in an inecient failure to reach agreement. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) link excess entry
into competitive markets to overcondence over relative ability. Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue
that managerial overcondence is responsible for corporate investment distortions. Cowgill et al.
(2009) nd optimistic bias in corporate prediction markets. Mullainathan and Washington (2009)
nd that voting for a candidate results in more positive views about the candidate. Park and Santos-
Pinto (2010) provide eld evidence for overcondence in tournaments. Mayraz (2011) nds that a
person's expectations for the future price of a nancial asset depend on whether he or she gains from
high or low prices. Homan (2011a,b) nds that truck drivers are optimistically biased about their
productivity (and hence their pay), resulting in an inecient failure to switch jobs.
2For example, credit markets (De Meza and Southey, 1996), banking (Manove and Padilla, 1999),
corporate nance (Heaton, 2002), search (Dubra, 2004), savings (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005),
insurance (Sandroni and Squintani, 2007), price discrimination (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2008), incentives
in organizations (Santos-Pinto, 2008), and nancial contracting (Landier and Thesmar, 2009). Studies
of overcondence over the accuracy of signals are excluded from this list.
2bets oer more scope for bias, optimism implies a ceteris paribus preference for risk.
If optimism is restricted to beliefs over ambiguous bets, it further implies a ceteris
paribus preference for ambiguity.4
This paper's approach is very dierent. Decision makers take their beliefs as given,
and maximize subjective expected utility in their choices. Their beliefs may, however,
depend on what they want to be true prior to making their choice. A number of
simplifying assumptions are imposed, yielding a representation with one non-standard
parameter, which determines both the direction and magnitude of the bias.
Some predictions are broadly similar to those of optimal delusion models. For
example, optimists underestimate their health risks, much as they would in an optimal
delusion model. The degree of bias is, however, independent of the impact on future
choices, and a substantial bias may occur even if its cost is high. Decision makers
are only biased about a choice if its outcome hangs on events that form part of their
existing interests. There is thus no general tendency to favor risky or ambiguous bets.
On the other hand, choices that align (conict) with an optimist's existing interests
are perceived to be relatively likely (unlikely) to lead to desirable outcomes. This
feature of the model leads to path dependence: an optimist who is invested in some
asset is biased in favor of increasing her exposure to the asset and against replacing
her existing investment with an opposite bet.5
Changes to the decision maker's interests aect beliefs, even if the relevant in-
formation is unchanged. This makes it possible to model cognitive dissonance as a
dynamic version of wishful thinking. For example, Knox and Inkster (1968) nd that
when bettors commit to place a bet on a horse, their condence that the horse would
win the race goes up. This nding can be readily explained by the change in interests:
the bettors are initially indierent as to which horse would win the race, but once they
place the bet they gain an interest in `their' horse winning. Beliefs are thus initially
unbiased, but become biased once the bet is placed. Exogenous changes in interests
are also predicted to aect beliefs. For example, the nding that congressmen become
more positive about women's interests after fathering a daughter (Washington, 2008)
3There are a number of papers in which agents manipulate their belief indirectly, by strategically
choosing what information to consume (Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000; K} oszegi, 2006) or by a biased
memory process (Benabou and Tirole, 2002; Compte and Postlewaite, 2004; Gottlieb, 2010).
4The connection between optimism (or pessimism) and preferences for risk and ambiguity is also
shared by such models as Hey (1984), Bracha and Brown (2010) and Dillenberger et al. (2011), in
which the probabilities used to evaluate an alternative vary with the payos in that alternative.
5In a labor context, such path dependence would lead to an ineciently low rate of quitting,
consistent with the ndings in Homan (2011a,b).
3can be explained by the consequent increase in alignment between a congressman's
interests and those of women.6
The core of the model is the precise relationship between a decision maker's beliefs
and her interests. Subjective beliefs are represented by a probability measure over the
set of states, and interests are represented by a payo-function, or the mapping associ-
ating each state with the utility that the decision maker obtains in that state. Letting
f denote the payo-function, I let  f denote the resulting probability measure. In
order to obtain a tractable representation, I make a number of simplifying assump-
tions, which take the form of special circumstances in which dierent payo-functions
do not result in dierent beliefs.
The formal framework and simplifying assumptions are presented in Section 2. A
representation theorem establishes that the assumptions are necessary and sucient
conditions for the existence of a probability measure p and a real-valued parameter




e f dp: (1)
Equation 1 takes a simpler form if the state-space is discrete, when it can be written
as follows, where s is any state:
 f.s/ / p.s/e f .s/: (2)
To understand this representation note rst that if f is constant then  f D p. The
probability measure p therefore represents the decision maker's indierence beliefs,
or the beliefs she would hold if she were a completely disinterested observer who is
indierent between all states. More generally, f is not constant, and  f depends on
both f and on  . If   is positive (negative)  f is higher in states in which payo
is higher (lower). A positive value of   therefore represents optimistic bias, and a
negative value represents pessimistic bias. The larger   is in absolute terms, the
greater the bias. In analogy with relative risk-aversion,   can be thought of as the
coecient of relative optimism. Standard decision makers are represented by   D 0.
Such decision makers are realists, and for them  f D p for all f .
Section 3 completes the model, and provides it with a revealed preferences axiom-
atization. The overall framework is that of reference-dependent preferences, where
6Socialization is an alternative explanation (Washington, 2008).
4preferences are over alternatives (acts), and the reference corresponds to the map-
ping from states to consequences that characterizes the decision maker prior to the
new choice. Axioms ensure (i) that holding the reference constant, preferences have a
subjective expected utility representation, (ii) that the utility function is not reference-
dependent (making this a model of reference-dependent beliefs), (iii) that the reference
aects beliefs only via the interests that follows from it, and (iv) that beliefs relate to
interests via Equation 1.
In the representation that follows from the axioms, each decision maker is dened
by a utility function u, a probability measure p, and a coecient of relative optimism
 .7 Let f denote the payo-function representing the decision maker's interests before
being presented with the choice set. According to the model, her choice maximizes
the expectation of u given  f, where  f is given by Equation 1.
One interpretation of the model is that subjective judgment is in some people
biased in an optimistic directions, and in others in a pessimistic direction. Decision
makers have standard tastes, and seek to maximize their (true) expected utility. Fre-
quently, however, they nd themselves having to resort to subjective judgment when
assessing the likelihood of events,8 and in those cases they end up with biased beliefs.
Biased beliefs then lead to biased choices.
The model with   > 0 provides a unied account of wishful thinking and cognitive
dissonance. These two biases can be seen, respectively, as simply the cross-sectional
and time-series manifestations of optimism. Overoptimism and overcondence in abil-
ity can be viewed as special cases of wishful-thinking.9 The model with   < 0 can be
used to represent unrealistic pessimism (Seligman, 1998).
Section 4 takes a closer look at the equations relating beliefs to interests. An
important insight is that they are formally identical to Bayes Rule, with p standing
for prior beliefs,  f for posterior beliefs, and  f .s/ for the log likelihood in state s.
It is thus as if optimists (pessimists) are Bayesian belief updaters, who believe that
7  and u are identied together, and the representation is unique up to a positive ane transfor-
mation. If u is replaced by u0 D au C b,   must be replaced by  0 D  =a.
8Knight (1921) emphasized the importance of subjective judgment in decisions under uncertainty:
\Business decisions, for example, deal with situations which are far too unique, generally speaking,
for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. The conception of an objectively
measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable." (III.VII.47);\Yet it is true, and the fact can
hardly be overemphasized, that a judgment of probability is actually made in such cases." (III.VII.40).
9Overoptimism is exemplied by the Weinstein (1980) nding that students believe desirable
(undesirable) life events are more (less) likely to happen to them than to other students. The
Svenson (1981) nding that most people believe themselves to be better drivers than most other
people is the best known example of overcondence.
5Nature has chosen the state of the world so as to make life better (worse) for them.
The comparative statics of the model are that the bias is increasing in the degree of
optimism or pessimism, the strength of the decision maker's interests, and the degree
of subjective uncertainty.10 High-stakes decisions result in smaller bias only if the
increased incentive to invest in information reduces the decision maker's uncertainty.
If good information is not available, a substantial bias may remain in spite of its costly
consequences.11
Section 5 examines belief updating. Changes to the decision maker's interests
can alter beliefs even in the absence of new information, as in the Knox and Inkster
(1968) study of horse bettors. A more subtle phenomenon appears whenever the
decision maker's interests involve a non-linear function of events. News about one
event can then alter the subjective probability of the other, even if the two events are
independent. For example, a professor's belief about the importance of publishing in
a top journal may depend on whether her paper is accepted.
When using the model in a new application it is necessary to introduce modeling
assumptions for p and for  . One option is to reinterpret rational expectations as
applying to the indierence beliefs p. Optimistic bias can be modeled simply by
assuming that   is positive. Consider the beliefs of investors during an asset bubble.
The implication of rational expectations is that investors with no exposure to the
asset hold unbiased beliefs about the prospect of market collapse. The assumption
that   > 0 implies that investors who hold the asset underestimate this probability.
The model makes it possible to adapt existing applications to incorporate the
implications of wishful thinking and cognitive dissonance. Suppose an agent in some
model maximizes expected utility given beliefs p and utility function u. In adapting
the model to allow for wishful thinking, the natural assumption is that p represents
the agent's indierence beliefs. Equation 1 can be used to compute the distorted
probability measure  f, which can then be used in place of p in predicting the agent's
choices.
Section 6 presents two applications. The rst shows that an optimism leads in-
vestors to escalate risky investments. The intuition is that taking up a risky invest-
ment creates an interest in the risk being low, and the investor consequently comes
10Intuitively, stronger optimism/pessimism and stronger interests correspond to stronger `evidence',
whereas more subjective uncertainty implies a weaker `prior'.
11The magnitude of the bias is measured by its eect on the subjective odds-ratio between events.
Since certainty corresponds to an innite odds-ratio, no amount of bias can cause a certain event to
be perceived as less than certain (or the other way around.)
6to believe the risk is lower than it really is. Given the revised risk assessment, the
investor feels secure in increasing the investment. The second application is to the
economics of crime. There is much evidence that increasing the severity of punish-
ment is a relatively ineective deterrent as compared with increasing the likelihood
of punishment (Grogger, 1991; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001; Durlauf and Nagin, 2011).
The model can explain this nding on the assumption that criminals are optimistic.
The intuition is that increasing the punishment gives criminals a stronger interest
in not getting caught, resulting in a bigger bias in their beliefs. Thus, while getting
caught is worse, it is also subjectively less likely. By contrast, increasing the likelihood
that criminals are brought to justice leaves the bias in their beliefs unchanged, and
unambiguously improves deterrence.
The model stands in an interesting relationship to models of reference-dependent
utility, such as K} oszegi and Rabin (2006). In both types of model preferences depend
on a reference act, but in K} oszegi and Rabin (2006) the utility of dierent outcomes
is dependent on the probability in which these outcomes are obtained, while in this
model the probability of dierent states is dependent on the utility in those states. In
K} oszegi and Rabin (2006) it makes no dierence in which particular states a given
consumption outcome is obtained (only the overall probability matters). In this model
it makes no dierence which particular outcome is obtained in a given state (only its
utility matters).
2 Belief distortion
The core of the model is the relationship between people's beliefs and what they want
to be true. In this section I state and prove a representation theorem that characterizes
this relationship. Section 2.1 describes the framework that links beliefs and interests,
the properties that are assumed to characterize this link, and the formal statement
of the theorem. Section 2.2 demonstrates the role of the individual assumptions, by
presenting the partial representation results that can be obtained with only a subset
of the assumptions. The proof is described for the special case in which there are only
nitely many events, making it possible to focus on the key ideas, while avoiding the
technical complications that arise in the more general case. Section 2.3 concludes the
proof of the representation theorem by extending this result to any measurable space.
72.1 Framework
Subjective uncertainty is dened over a measurable-space .S;6/, where S is the set
of states, and 6 is a -algebra of subsets of S, called events. The decision maker's
interests are represented by a payo-function, which is a mapping associating each
state with the utility that is obtained in that state. I let X D [m; M]  R denote
the set of all feasible payos, which I assume to be an interval which includes 0.
A payo-function is formally a 6-measurable mapping f : S ! X. Let F denote
the set of all such functions, and let 1 denote the set of all -additive probability
measures over .S;6/. The key ingredient in the model is a distortion mapping  :
F ! 1, associating with each payo-function a probability measure over .S;6/. The
distortion mapping  is the formal representation of the possibility that a person's
beliefs are a function of her interests. The goal of this section is to develop a tractable
representation for .
In the following denitions f and f 0 stand for any payo-functions, a for any
constant payo-function, and E for any event. The rst denition states the properties
we want the distortion mapping to satisfy, and the second describes the logit-distortion
formula. The theorem says that the two denitions are equivalent.
Denition 1.  : F ! 1 is a well-behaved distortion if the following conditions are
satised:
A1 (absolute continuity)  f 0.E/ D 0 ()  f.E/ D 0.
A2 (consequentialism) If f D f 0 over a non-null12 event E then  f 0.jE/ D  f.jE/.
A3 (shift-invariance) If f 0 D f C a then  f 0 D  f.
A4 (prize-continuity) If fn ! f then  fn.E/ !  f.E/.
These properties should be understood as simplifying assumptions, the purpose of
which is to obtain as simple as possible a representation, while retaining the ability
to represent the phenomena we wish to model. Absolute Continuity limits belief
distortion to events that the decision maker is uncertain about. Consequentialism
requires that if two payo-functions coincide over some event E then the corresponding
probability measures conditional on E also coincide. Consider two events E1 and E2
12That is, both  f .E/ > 0 and  f 0.E/ > 0. Absolute Continuity ensures that these two require-
ments coincide.
8that are subsets of E and an event F that is outside E. According to Consequentialism,
a change in the payo in F can aect the overall probability of E1 and E2, but it cannot
aect their relative probability. Shift Invariance requires subjective probabilities to
depend only on payo dierences between states. A person's interests in an event
being true are dened by how much she has to gain or lose (in utility terms) if the event
is true. Increasing all payos by a constant leaves interests unchanged, and should
not result in a change to beliefs. Prize Continuity requires that small dierences in
payos have only a small eect on beliefs.
Denition 2 (Logit distortion).  : F ! 1 is a logit distortion if there exists a
probability measure p (the indierence measure), and a real-number   (the coecient




e f dp: (3)
Consequentialism only has bite when there are at least three events with positive
probability. This condition is therefore necessary for the equivalence between the two
denitions to hold.
Denition 3 (Minimally complex distortion).  : F ! 1 is minimally complex if
there exists three disjoint events A, B, and C, and a payo-function f such that
 f.A/,  f.B/, and  f.C/ are all positive.
Theorem 1 (Representation theorem). A minimally complex distortion is a logit-
distortion if and only if it is well-behaved.
2.2 Intermediate representation results
In this section I prove the theorem for the special case where there are only nitely
many events. That is, I assume that there exists a nite partition S of the state-space,
such that 6 is the algebra generated by S. In addition, I prove a sequence of partial
representation results requiring only a subset of the assumptions. In order to state the
necessary and sucient conditions for these representations I dene a new property,
Indierence, which is related to Shift Invariance, but is considerably weaker:
A3' (Indierence).  f D  f 0 if both f and f 0 are constant payo-functions.
9Note that unlike Shift Invariance, Indierence does not require the set of payos to
have cardinal (or even ordinal) meaning.
Lemma 1. Suppose that there exists a nite partition S of the state-space, such that
6 is the algebra generated by S, and that  is minimally complex, then:
1. Absolute Continuity is a necessary and sucient condition for there to exist a
probability distribution p 2 1 and a function h : F  S ! RC, such that for
any payo-function f and any event A 2 S,
 f.A/ / p.A/ h f.A/: (4)
2. Assume Absolute Continuity. Consequentialism is a necessary and sucient
condition for there to exist a probability distribution p 2 1, and a mapping
 : S  X ! RC, such that for any payo-function f and any event A 2 S,
 f.A/ / p.A/ A. f .A//: (5)
3. Assume Absolute Continuity and Consequentialism. Indierence is a necessary
and sucient condition for there to exist a probability distribution p 2 1, and a
mapping  : X ! RC, such that for any payo-function f and any event A 2 S,
 f.A/ / p.A/ . f .A//: (6)
4. Assume Absolute Continuity and Consequentialism. Shift-Invariance and Prize-
Continuity are necessary and sucient conditions for there to exists a probability
distribution p 2 1, and a parameter   2 R, such that for any payo-function
f and any event A 2 S,
 f.A/ / p.A/ e f .A/: (7)
Note that while the representation in Equations 4{7 is dened with respect to
events in S, the implication for general events is straightforward.13 The following
simple example demonstrates that Minimal Complexity is a necessary assumption.
Let S D fA; Bg, let  f.A/ / p.A/.1 C . f .A/   f .B//2/ and  f.B/ / p.B/. This
13Any event in 6 is the nite union of events in S.
10distortion is well-behaved (Denition 1), but it cannot even be given the representation
of Equation 5, let alone that of a logit distortion (Denition 2).
2.3 Completing the proof
This section concludes the proof of Theorem 1 for the general case. The rst step is
to generalize Equation 7 to any payo-function and any constant-payo events:
Lemma 2. Suppose  : F ! 1 is a minimally complex well-behaved distortion, then
there exist a probability measure p and a parameter   2 R, such that for any payo-








e f .B/: (8)
Theorem 1 for simple payo-functions is an immediate corollary.14 The following claim
is a little more general, allowing for functions that are almost everywhere simple:
Denition 4. A payo-function f 2 F is almost everywhere simple if there exists a
payo-function g 2 F and an event E such that f obtains only nitely many values
on E and g.E/ D 1.
Corollary 1. Theorem 1 holds when restricted to payo-functions that are almost
everywhere simple.
The remaining case involves functions which are not almost everywhere simple. If such
payo-functions exist, there must also exist an innite sequence of non-null events
fAngn2N. But then, as long as   6D 0 and the set of feasible payos is unbounded, it
is possible to construct a payo function f such that limn!1
 f .An/
 f .A1/ D 1. But this
implies that  f.A1/ D 0, in contradiction to Absolute Continuity. Hence, if   6D 0
the set of feasible payos must be bounded.
Lemma 3. Suppose  : F ! 1 is a minimally complex well-behaved distortion, and
that there exists a payo-function f that is not everywhere simple, then there exist an
upper bound M 2 R, such that for any feasible payo-value x, e x  M.
Lemma 3 ensures that e X is bounded from above. If it is also bounded from below,
a limit argument based on simple payo-functions can be used to extend the claim
further:
14A payo-function f is simple if f .S/ is nite.
11Lemma 4. Suppose  : F ! 1 is a minimally complex well-behaved distortion then
there exists a probability measure p and a parameter   2 R, such that for any events A
and B for which p.B/ > 0, and any payo-function f for which there exist a number





A e f dp
R
B e f dp
: (9)
The nal step in the proof of Theorem 1 uses a limit argument whereby a general event
A is approached by events of the form An D fs 2 A : e f .s/  2 ng, and Lemma 4 is
applied on each of these events separately.
3 Preferences
Section 2 characterizes the relationship between beliefs and interests. This section
completes the model, by embedding this dependence in a complete model of choice,
and providing it with a revealed-preferences axiomatization. The overall framework is
that of reference-dependent preferences, as is the case in models of reference-dependent
utility. The axioms in this section, however, ensure that this model is one of reference-
dependent beliefs. Further axioms ensure that the particular consequences that are
obtained in dierent states are irrelevant, and that the only thing that matters is the
utility value associated with any given consequence. In other words, a reference act
aects beliefs only via the associated payo-function. A nal set of axioms restates the
simplifying assumptions of Section 2 in revealed preferences terms. The resulting rep-
resentation comprises three elements that are determined together: a utility-function,
a probability-measure, and a real-valued coecient of relative-optimism.
Both the reference and the choices are acts, or mappings from states to conse-
quences. For example, in an investment application, the reference may be an in-
vestor's current portfolio, represented by a mapping from market outcomes to dierent
amounts of money, and the choice set may be a selection of alternative portfolios. More
generally, consequences can also be objective lotteries over nal outcomes, making it
possible to model situations in which a person takes some probabilities as given. A
bet on a coin-toss, for example, involves no subjective uncertainty, and is represented
by an act mapping all subjective states to the same 50-50 lottery over the possible
outcomes of the bet. More interestingly, it is possible to model uncertainty over which
12of several probabilistic models is correct. For example, a smoker may be uncertain
whether smoking increases her risk of getting cancer. States correspond to whether
this is or isn't the case, and the smoker's situation is described by an act mapping
these states into dierent probabilities of cancer. A non smoker's situation would be
described by an act mapping both states to the same low probability.15
3.1 Framework
Let S denote the set of subjective states, and let 6 be a -algebra of events. I let
Z denote the set of nal outcomes. An (Anscombe-Aumann) act is a 6-measurable
mapping a : S ! 1.Z/, associating with each subjective state an objective lottery
over nal outcomes.16 I denote by A the set of all acts. The key object is a set
of reference-dependent preferences : A ! 2A, associating with each act e 2 A a
preference relation e. The interpretation of g e h is that the decision maker prefers
g over h if her reference act is e.
In the following let g;h;e;e0 and en denote general acts, and let a and b denote
constant acts.17 Let s and s0 denote general states, and let E denote a general event.
For an act e and a state s, let es denote the constant act yielding e.s/ in all states.
Let es  es0 if for all acts d, es d e0
s. Finally, an event E is e null if g e h for all
g and h that dier only on E. The assumptions on  are as follows:
B1 (Anscombe-Aumann) For all e 2 A, e has an Anscombe-Aumann expected
utility representation.
B2 (objectivity) For all e;e0 2 A, eDe0 over constant acts.
B3 (indierence) If es  e0
s for all s then eDe0.18
B4 (non-triviality) For any act e there exist constant acts a and b such that a e b.
15Assuming both are optimistic, the smoker|but not the non-smoker|is therefore likely to un-
derestimate the link between smoking and cancer.
16Acts mapping states into objective lotteries over nal consequences were introduced by Anscombe
and Aumann (1963).
17A constant Anscombe-Aumann act yields the same objective lottery in all states.
18That is, for e and e0 to result in dierent preferences, it is not enough that e.s/ 6D e0.s/ for some
state s|it is also necessary that one of these outcomes is strictly preferred to the other (formally,
the decision maker has strict preferences between the constant acts es and e0
s. B2 ensures that these
preferences are well-dened.)
13B5 (best and worst act) For any act e there exist constant acts a and a such that
for any act g, a e g e a.
B6 (absolute continuity) E is e null () E is e0 null.
B7 (consequentialism) If e D e0 over E and g D h outside E then g e h ()
g e0 h.
B8 (shift-invariance) If for some  2 [0;1], e D gC.1 /a and e0 D gC.1 /b,
then eDe0.19
B9 (continuity) If en ! e uniformly20 then en! e.21
Let h 2 A be any act mapping states to lotteries over nal outcomes, and let u :
Z ! R denote a function mapping nal outcomes to real numbers. I use the notation
uh : S ! R to denote the mapping from states to real numbers that is obtained by
taking the expected value of u in each state. That is, uh.s/ D
R
Z u.hs.z//dz.
The representation we wish to obtain is the following:
Denition 5. The reference-dependent preferences : A ! 2A are logit preferences if
there exist a probability measure p over .S;6/ (the indierence measure), a function
u : Z ! R (the utility function), and a real number   (the coecient of relative
optimism), such that for any reference act e 2 A, e ranks acts according to the





where g 2 A is any act, F D fue : e 2 Ag, and  : F ! 1.S/ is a logit distortion
(Denition 2). The trio .p;u; / is then said to represent .
As in Section 2 (and for the same reason) the proof requires the existence of at
least three disjoint non-null events:
Denition 6.  is minimally complex if there exist an act e and disjoint events A,
B, and C that are not null with respect to e.
19This condition implies that the utility dierence between e and e0 is the same in all states.
20For any  > 0 and any state s 2 S there exists n0 2 N, such that for all n > n0 and for any
outcome z 2 Z, jen.s/.z/   e.s/.z/j <  (the dierence in the probability the two acts assign to
outcome z in state s is less than )
21For all acts g and h, if g e h then there exists n0 2 N, such that for all n > n0, g en h.
14Theorem 2. Suppose  are reference-dependent preferences and that assumptions
B1-B9 hold, then  are logit preferences. Moreover, if both .p;u; / and .p0;u0; 0/
represent , then p0 D p and there exist a positive real-number  and a real-number




B1 is an omnibus axiom, requiring that|conditional on the reference act|preferences
have a subjective expected utility representation. Thus, for any reference act e there
exists a probability measure e 2 1.S/ and a utility function ue : Z ! R, such that
e ranks acts according to Ve.g/ D
R
S.ueg/de. This representation allows for both
beliefs and tastes to vary with the reference act e. B2 rules out the latter possibility by
imposing the requirement that the ranking of constant Anscombe-Aumann acts does
not depend on e. Since the ranking of constant Anscombe-Aumann acts identies the
utility function up at a positive ane transformation, there exists a utility-function
u, such that ue D u for all e. Given that e ranks acts in accordance with Ve.g/ D
R
S.ug/de, B3 implies that e D e0 whenever ue D ue0. Beliefs may, therefore,
depend on the reference act only via the associated payo-function. Let F D fue : e 2
Ag. Given B3, there exists a mapping  : F ! 1.S/, such that e D ue for all e.22
B4 is a technical assumption ruling out the trivial case in which the decision maker
is indierent between all acts. Non-triviality ensures that it is possible to back out
ue from observing e. Hence, eDe0 if and only if ue D ue0. We thus obtain the
following Lemma:
Lemma 5. Suppose B1-B4, then (i) there exists a utility function u : 1.Z/ ! R, and
a mapping  : F ! 1.S/ where F D fue : e 2 Ag, such that for any e 2 A, e ranks





and (ii) for any two acts e and e0, eDe0 if and only if ue D ue0.
B5 is a second technical assumption, ensuring that there exist a best and a worst
lottery (and therefore also a best and a worst outcome). B6-B9 eectively restate as-
sumptions A1-A4 of Denition 1. The proof of the following Lemma is in Appendix A.
22 is formally dened by choosing for any payo-function f some particular act e. f / to represent
the equivalence class of all the acts having f as their payo-function, and dening . f / D e. f /.
15Lemma 6. Suppose B5-B9 hold in addition to B1-B4 then the mapping  in Lemma 5
is a well-behaved distortion.
The main claim in Theorem 2, namely the existence of a triplet .p;u; / representing
 in accordance with Equation 10 and Denition 2, is an immediate corollary of
Lemmas 5 and 6 together with Theorem 1. The proof of the uniqueness part is in
Appendix A.
4 The belief distortion function
This section takes a close look at the belief distortion function that was derived in
Section 2. Let  denote the mapping from payo-functions to beliefs. According to
Theorem 1, if the simplifying assumptions hold, there exists a probability measure p,




e f dp: (12)
Consider rst the case where f is constant, representing a situation in which the
decision maker is equally well-o in all states, and hence indierent as to what the
true state is. The e f term drops out, and we obtain that  f D p. The probability
measure p can therefore be identied with a decision maker's indierence beliefs, or
the beliefs she would hold if she were a disinterested observer. More generally, e f
is increasing in the payo if   is positive, decreasing in the payo if   is negative,
and independent of it if   D 0. A positive value of   therefore represents optimistic
bias, a negative represents pessimistic bias, and a zero value represents realism. The
magnitude of belief distortion increases when moving away from zero, whether in the
optimistic or pessimistic direction. In analogy with the coecient of relative risk
aversion,   is the coecient of relative optimism.
Equation 12 allows for payos to vary arbitrarily between dierent states. If we
restrict attention to events over which the payo is constant, we can rewrite the
equation as follows:
 f.A/ / p.A/ e f .A/: (13)
Further insight can be obtained by comparing the probability of two events in relation
to each other. Suppose that f is constant over two events A and B, and that B is










Figure 1: Iso-belief lines for an optimist as a function of the undistorted log odds-ratio on
the x-axis and the payo dierence between the two events on the y-axis. Iso-belief lines are
straight and slope down and to the right with a slope of 1
 . The Iso-belief lines for pessimists
slope upward and to the right. Those of a realist are vertical.









f .A/   f .B/

: (14)
The bias in the relative probability of two events depends only on the payo-dierence,
or the degree to which one is more desirable than the other. If a decision maker is
indierent between two events, their relative probability is unchanged.
More generally, the same subjective probabilities may result from dierent combi-
nations of interests (represented by the payo-dierence f .A/  f .B/) and information
(represented by the indierence log odds-ratio log
p.A/
p.B/). Since Equation 14 is linear,
the resulting iso-belief lines are also linear (Figure 1).
4.1 Payos as information
The equations of the model have a close analogue in Bayes Rule. For Equation 13 the
analogous equation is the following:
p.Aje/ / p.A/ L.ejA/; (15)
23By Absolute Continuity, the set of non-null events is the same for all reference payo-functions.
17where e represents new evidence, p represents beliefs prior to observing the new ev-
idence, p.Aje/ represents posterior beliefs, and L.ejA/ the likelihood of the new evi-













p.B/ is the prior odds ratio,
p.Aje/
p.Bje/ is the posterior odds ratio, and
L.ejA/
L.ejB/ is the
likelihood ratio. A comparison of these equations reveals a perfect correspondence,
with p standing for indierence or prior beliefs,  f for distorted or posterior beliefs,
and  f .A/ for the log-likelihood of the evidence in A, with an analogous expression
for B.
It is thus possible to view optimism and pessimism as a Bayesian update on an
expanded state-space. Starting with indierence beliefs (represented by p) as her prior,
the decision maker observes the payo-function f , and updates her beliefs to arrive
at the posterior  f. The payo in an event functions as evidence about its likelihood:
an optimist (pessimist) takes high payo to be evidence that an event is more (less)
likely. It is as if optimists (pessimists) believe that nature is not an indierent force,
but is instead well-disposed (ill-disposed) toward them. Given that nature took their
interests into account when choosing the state, the can make inferences about nature's
choice by observing what their interest are.24
4.2 Optimism and pessimism
Suppose a decision maker's beliefs are reference dependent with some distortion map-
ping , and that some particular probability measure p represents her beliefs whenever
she is indierent between all states. Let Pf.x/ D p. f  x/ denote the indierence
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of payo, and let 5 f.x/ D  f. f  x/ de-
note the corresponding CDF for  f. For two distributions F and G let F 1 G if
F rst-order stochastically dominates G, and F LR G if F stochastically dominates
G in the likelihood ratio.25 If we identify a better payo distribution with rst-order
stochastic dominance, we can give optimism and pessimism the following denition:
Denition 7. A decision maker is an optimist (pessimist) if 5 f 1 Pf (Pf 1 5 f).
24Compare the `pessimistic' interpretation of certain models of ambiguity aversion, where a malev-
olent nature chooses the state of the world after after the decision maker makes a choice.
25That is, if there exists a non-decreasing function h : R ! RC, such that F.x/ /
R x
 1 h.x/dG.x/.
18A decision maker who is both an optimist and a pessimist is a realist.
The following proposition establishes the relationship between this denition and the
coecient of relative optimism  :
Proposition 1. Suppose a decision maker's beliefs are characterized by a logit distor-
tion with a coecient of relative optimism  , then the decision maker is an optimist
(pessimist) if and only if    0 (   0). Moreover,    0 ) 5 f LR Pf and
   0 ) Pf LR 5 f.
Logit distortions are therefore a tractable subset of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs,
much as the class of constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA) preferences is a tractable
subset of risk seeking and risk averse preferences.
The higher (lower)   is, the more probability shifts toward the states with the
highest (lowest) possible payo. If there are only nitely many payo values, the
limit is always well-dened, and takes a particularly simple form: an extreme optimist
(pessimist) is certain she would obtain the best (worst) possible payo:
Proposition 2 (extreme optimism/pessimism). Let f be a simple payo-function,
and let Amin and Amax denote respectively the event that the minimal (maximal) payo
is obtained, then lim !1  f.Amax/ D lim ! 1  f.Amin/ D 1.
One case of particular interest is when payo is linear in some normally distributed
random variable. When that is the case, optimism and pessimism simply shift the
mean of the distribution, the shift being proportional to the variance and to the
coecient of relative optimism:
Proposition 3 (normally distributed payos). Suppose X : S ! R is a random
variable with indierence distribution PX  N.;2/, and that there exist a;b 2 R,
such that the payo-function is f D aX C b, then 5X  N. C  a2;2/.
4.3 Comparative statics
The intuition for the comparative statics can be obtained by writing Equation 14
qualitatively as follows:
beliefs D indierence beliefs C   interests: (17)
19The magnitude of the bias is thus increasing in the strength of the decision maker's
interests and decreasing in the sharpness of indierence beliefs (increasing in the degree
of uncertainty). This is seen most clearly if payo is linear in a normally distributed
random variable, i.e. f .s/ D aX.s/ C b, where X  N.;2/. According to Propo-
sition 3 the distorted probability density function is also normal, the variance is the
same, and the mean is shifted in proportion to  a2. The bias is thus increasing in
the strength of interests a and in the degree of uncertainty 2.
Another important case is when payo is binary. Suppose f D v over some event








1Cp.E/.e v 1/ v. The bias thus goes up
with the strength of interests jvj, and goes down as indierence beliefs approach
certainty (p.E/ ! 0 or p.E/ ! 1).
There is evidence for both comparative statics. Weinstein (1980) and Sj oberg
(2000) elicit beliefs over events which vary in how desirable or undesirable they are,
and nd more biased beliefs over events that are either strongly desirable or strongly
undesirable. Mijovi c-Prelec and Prelec (2010) similarly nd a larger bias in an experi-
mental treatment in which interests are stronger. Mayraz (2011) elicits predictions of
future prices in dierent price charts, and nds more bias in charts in which subjective
uncertainty is high.
The importance of accurate beliefs for decisions is not part of the comparative
statics. When stakes are, high decision makers may put more eort into collecting in-
formation, and if this information reduces subjective uncertainty, it would also reduce
the bias. However, controlling for information, the magnitude of the bias is indepen-
dent of its costs.26 Wishful thinking may thus be an important factor in high-stakes
decisions, despite the resulting welfare loss.
5 Belief change
The model denes a person's beliefs in relation to her indierence beliefs, or the beliefs
she would have held if she were completely indierent about the state of the world
(Equations 12{14). Beliefs can change for one of the following two reasons: (i) the
indierence beliefs change, or (ii) the magnitude of the bias changes. Assuming the
coecient of relative optimism is xed, the magnitude of the bias changes if and only
26The ndings in Mayraz (2011) and Homan (2011b) are consistent with this prediction.
20if the decision maker's interests change. Indierence beliefs change if there is a change
in relevant information.
5.1 Interests
Changes to the decision maker's interests can alter beliefs even in the absence of
any new relevant information. The most important reason for a change in interests
is the making of a new commitment. For example, when an investor buys some
nancial asset, she gains an interest in the price of the asset going up. According to
the model, this should cause her beliefs about the asset to become more optimistic.
This prediction ts many cognitive dissonance ndings, such as the Knox and Inkster
(1968) nding that bettors become more condent that a horse would win the race
after placing a bet on the horse.27 Section 6.1 shows that this kind of belief change
can cause commitments to escalate.
Interests can also change for exogenous reasons. Consider the beliefs of optimistic
parents whose child is to be allocated randomly to one of two schools: A or B. The
parents want their child to be allocated to the best school, but they initially do not
know what school their child would attend. Consequently, when they learn that their
child is to be allocated to school A, they gain an interest in A being the better school.
The prediction of the model is that this change in interests would cause their beliefs
to shift, so that they come to think more highly of school A.28
5.2 Relevant information
The observation of relevant new information results in a Bayesian update to the de-
cision maker's indierence beliefs. Because the bias can itself be seen as a Bayesian
update (Section 4.1), the relationship between ex-post distorted beliefs and ex-ante
27Suppose the bettor is optimistic (  > 0), and let E denote the event that the horse wins the
race. Assuming no existing interest in the horse winning the race, the ex-ante payo function is
constant, and beliefs coincide with the indierence probability measure p. Placing the bet causes the
payo-dierence between E and N E to increase to some positive amount b. According to Equation 13,
the odds-ratio between the two events increases by a factor of e b > 1.
28If the parents are pessimistic, their beliefs would shift in the opposite direction.
21distorted beliefs is also Bayesian.29
However, because distorted beliefs depend on the payo-function, when two vari-
ables are complements or substitutes in the payo-function, they become dependent in
the decision maker's beliefs. Consequently, the Bayesian update following news about
one of the two will alter beliefs about the other, even if they are objectively indepen-
dent. The update in the decision maker's beliefs after observing new information is
thus formally Bayesian, but may nonetheless appear biased to outside observers.
Consider the following example. An optimistic manager's promotion may or may
not be dependent on the success of a merger deal, this being determined independently
of the deal's success. The manager's payo is particularly high (low) if the deal is both
successful and important for promotion (unsuccessful and important). Consequently,
the subjective probability that the merger is both important and successful is biased
upward, and the probability that it is important and unsuccessful is biased downward.
The two events are thus subjectively correlated, and news about one will aect beliefs
about the other (Figure 2).
In this example, two complements (importance and success) become positively
correlated in the decision maker's beliefs. Substitutes would become negatively corre-
lated. For example, if a company pursues two research approaches in parallel, success
in one would decrease the subjective probability that the other approach could have
worked, whereas failure would increase the condence that the other approach would
succeed. These two eects are reversed if a decision maker is a pessimist.
The following proposition is a formal statement of these observations. Payo is
assumed to be the function of two random variables X and Y, which an unbiased
decision maker would consider to be independent. An event E is observed, where E is
independent of X, and is indicative of a high value of Y. Normatively, therefore, the
observation of E should change beliefs about Y, but leave beliefs about X unchanged.

















































 f I U
S 4=9 2=9
F 1=9 2=9
Figure 2: Merger example. Let S; F; I, and U denote respectively the event that the deal
is successful, unsuccessful, important and unimportant. The payo f is 1 if the deal is
successful and important for promotion, -1 if it is important and unsuccessful, and 0 if it
is not important. The indierence beliefs p are symmetric, and the distorted beliefs  f are
computed on the assumption that   D log2. Learning that the deal is important, increases
the subjective probability that it is a success from 2/3 to 4/5, even though the two events are
objectively independent. Similarly, learning that the deal has failed, decreases the subjective
probability that it would be important from 5=9 to 1=3.
The possibility that X and Y are complements (substitutes) is captured by the notion
of supermodularity (submodularity). When that is the case, the observation of E
would nonetheless result in a change in beliefs about X.
Proposition 4. Suppose the payo-function f is a function of two real-valued random
variables X and Y, such that p.X D x;Y D y/ D p.X D x/p.Y D y/ for all x; y 2 R,
and suppose that E is an event such that p.X D x;Y D yjE/ D p.Y D yjE/ for all x
and y, and that p.EjY D y/ is an increasing function of y, then
1. 5XjE LR 5X if (i)    0 and f is supermodular, or (ii)    0 and f is
submodular.
2. 5X LR 5XjE if (i)    0 and f is submodular, or (ii)    0 and f is
supermodular.
Moreover, the above relations of stochastic dominance in the likelihood ratio are strict
whenever   6D 0, f is strictly supermodular/submodular, p.EjY D y/ is strictly in-
creasing in y, and neither X nor Y is almost everywhere constant.
6 Applications
In this section I explore two applications. The rst is to investing, and the second to
crime deterrence.
236.1 Increasing exposure to risk
Since beliefs depend on interests, a decision to bet on some event causes a change in
the subjective probability for the event in question (Section 5.1). It follows that an
optimistic investor who invests in a risky asset would subsequently prefer to increase
her investment. Assuming the original choice is optimal, the opportunity to revise the
investment leads to welfare loss. Moreover, it is possible for the investor to end up
with a lower level of expected utility than if she had kept all her money in the safe
asset. The investor may thus be better o without any access to the risky asset.
Consider an optimistic investor with log utility and initial wealth w who can invest
a fraction  of her wealth in a risky asset that pays 1 in the good state G and  1 in
the bad state B. She makes an initial investment in period 1, and can then revise her
investment in period 2. If the subjective probability of the good state is q, she would
choose to invest a fraction .q/ D 2q   1 of her wealth in the risky asset.30
Let p.G/ > 0:5 denote the objective probability of the good state, and suppose that
the investor has rational expectations if she has no stake in the risky asset.31 Since this
is her situation prior to the t D 1 decision, she would invest a fraction 1 D 2p.G/ 1
of her wealth in the risky asset. Following this investment, her payo-function is
f .G/ D log.w C w/ D log.2p.G/w/ and f .B/ D log.w   w/ D log.2p.B/w/. The
new subjective beliefs can be computed using Equation 13:
 f.G/ D
p.G/e f .G/
p.G/e f .G/ C p.B/e f .B/ D
p.G/e  log.2p.G/w/
p.G/e  log.2p.G/w/ C p.B/e  log.2p.G/w/
D
p.G/.2p.G/w/ 






1C  > p.G/;
(18)
where the inequality follows from the assumption that   > 0 (the investor is opti-
mistic). Given that  f.G/ > p.G/, the investor would increase the share invested
in the risky asset to 2 D 2 f.G/   1 > 1. Since expected utility is a strictly
concave function of this amount, the opportunity to revise the investment results in
welfare loss. Moreover, lim !1  f.G/ D 1, and hence lim !1  D 1. Further-
more, limx!0 log.x/ D  1. Combining these observations, it follows that as long
as p.G/ < 1, there is a critical value  , such that for all   >   the (objective)
30Expected utility is q log.w C w/ C .1   q/log.w   w/. Since q > 0:5, the solution is internal.
Solving the rst order condition we obtain that .q/ D 2q   1.
31The rational expectations assumptions is useful for welfare analysis.
24expected utility following the opportunity to revise the investment is below the utility
of investing nothing in the risky asset. A suciently optimistic investor would thus
be better o without the opportunity to invest in the risky asset.
6.2 Deterrence
The two principal approaches to crime deterrence are (i) improving law enforcement,
and (ii) increasing sentencing. The rst makes punishment more likely, and the second
makes it more severe. There is good evidence that the rst approach is considerably
more eective (Grogger, 1991; Nagin and Pogarsky, 2001; Durlauf and Nagin, 2011). In
this section I oer one explanation for why that may be the case. I follow Becker (1968)
in modeling the decision to engage in crime as rational, but assume that criminals are
optimistic, and that they therefore underestimate the probability that they would end
up in jail. An increase in the severity of punishment increases the payo dierence
between getting caught and not getting caught. As I show in the formal model, this
leads to an an increase in the bias. Thus, a more severe punishment has an ambiguous
eect on deterrence: on the one hand jail is subjectively worse (the sentence is more
severe), but on the other hand it is subjectively less likely (because of the increased
optimistic bias). In some cases, an increase in the severity of punishment can even
be counter-productive. By contrast, increasing the likelihood that crime is punished
leaves the bias in beliefs unchanged, and unambiguously improves deterrence.
An optimistic criminal has to choose whether to continue a life of crime or to take
up a job at McDonald's. There are two states corresponding to whether or not crime
would land the criminal in jail. The payo from crime is f .B/ D  c in the bad state
and f .G/ D 0 in the good state. The payo from a job at McDonald's is  b in both
states, with 0 < b < c. Let p denote the probability measure representing the beliefs
the criminal would have had if she were indierent as to whether crime would land
her in jail, and assume that p is unbiased.32 Since crime is the status-quo, subjective
beliefs are represented by the distorted probability measure  f, where f denotes the
payo-function of a criminal. Using Equation 13 we obtain that
 f .B/
 f .G/ D
p.B/
p.G/ e  c:
Deterrence is successful if the expected gain from quitting crime is more than the








































Figure 3: The impact on the subjective utility of crime of increasing punishment levels
from relatively lenient (solid blue line) to severe (dotted red line). At any given subjective
probability, greater severity reduces utility (panel 1). However, greater severity also reduces
the subjective probability that the bad state is realized (panel 2). The net eect (panel 3) is
ambiguous, and can actually be positive if the objective probability of the bad state is low.










Consider the following two potential policy changes. First, the government can im-
prove law enforcement, thereby increasing
p.B/
p.G/. Holding c constant, such a change
would increase the RHS of Equation 19, while leaving the LHS unchanged, and would
therefore improve deterrence for any level of optimism. Second, the government can
increase in the severity of jail c, leaving its probability unchanged. If   D 0 the change
would reduce the LHS, and leave the RHS unchanged. Thus, for realist criminals any
increase in the severity of punishment improves deterrence. However, for optimistic
criminals   > 0, and so the increase in c reduces the RHS of Equation 19 at the same
time as it is reducing the LHS. There are thus two forces pulling in opposite direc-
tions: (i) the utility eect works to increase deterrence (jail is worse), and (ii) the
probability eect works to decrease deterrence (jail is subjectively less likely). Since
limc!1.c   b/e  c D 0 for   > 0, making the punishment more severe is counter-
productive beyond a certain point (Figure 3). Note that the key to these results is
the assumption that crime is the status-quo. A decision maker who has never before
engaged in crime would be deterred by a more severe punishment.
267 Conclusion
By tying beliefs to the decision maker's existing interests|rather than to the choices
that she faces|the model separates optimism and pessimism from attitudes toward
risk and ambiguity. Since beliefs depend on interests, any change to these interests
leads to a change in beliefs. This allows the model to capture not only static belief
biases, but also the dynamic phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. Since the bias is
not assumed to be welfare enhancing, it is possible to model pessimistic as well as
optimistic bias, and to model optimistic bias in situations where it leads to costly
mistakes. The model is tractable and parsimonious, and can be used both in the
construction of entirely new applications, and in adapting existing applications to in-
corporate the implications of wishful thinking, cognitive dissonance, and other related
biases.
While the model is surely too simple to be empirically correct, it does seem consis-
tent with broad features of the evidence. In particular, the existing evidence suggests
that the magnitude of the bias is indeed not directly dependent on its cost (Mayraz,
2011; Homan, 2011b). This has the important implication that the biases captured
by the model are not limited to low stakes decisions, and may well be important in
high-stakes decision environments. When stakes are high, decision makers have strong
incentives to double-check their probability judgments, and in particular to try and
detect any evidence of bias in their beliefs. However, whenever there is signicant
uncertainty, there is a large range of plausible views, and biased beliefs would gener-
ally fall within this range. For this reason, even highly motivated and sophisticated
decision makers may be unable to determine whether their own beliefs are biased, and
would not be able to prevent such bias from aecting their decisions.
Both individual decision makers and policy makers may, however, be able to iden-
tify situations in which biased beliefs are liable to be a signicant problem. Decision
makers may then try to either reduce the degree of bias, or avoid such situations
altogether. The deterrence application is an example of the former strategy: policy
makers, who realize that criminals may be biased in judging the probability of ending
up in jail, may therefore prefer to impose less severe punishments, and put their re-
sources instead into increasing the probability that criminals are brought to justice.
In the investment application, sophisticated investors may adopt the second strategy,
committing to some particular portfolio, and not allowing themselves the exibility of
revising it. Such a strategy involves a trade-o analogous to the bias-variance trade-o
27in statistics: exibility makes it possible to use more information in decision making,
but at the same time it opens up the door for bias.
One important weakness of the model is the need to specify exactly what elements
of uncertainty are subject to belief distortion. For example, the predictions in the de-
terrence application (Section 6.2) depend crucially on the assumption that the severity
of punishment is taken as given, whereas the likelihood of getting caught is subjec-
tive.33 A second weakness is that in some situations the decision maker's interests
are tied to her plans, and these plans may not be readily observable. Consider two
investors who are holding the same portfolio. A short-term speculator stands to gain
if the portfolio does well over the near future, and would therefore be biased about
this possibility. A long-term investor would, instead, be biased about long-term per-
formance. Making a prediction therefore requires the ability to identify the type of
the investor, as well as the stocks that she owns.
This paper assumes throughout that the coecient of relative optimism is a stable
characteristic of a person. One intriguing possibility, however, is that it increases
following good events, and decreases following bad ones. Consistent with this idea,
there is evidence that people are more positive about the stock market when the
weather is good (Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003), or after their soccer
team wins an international match (Edmans et al., 2007). Similarly, optimistic bias
in Google's prediction markets is particularly high in days in which Google's stock
is appreciating (Cowgill et al., 2009). Such dynamics may be important during the
popping of an asset bubble, when decreasing prices lead to losses, which in turn (if
this hypothesis is true) reduce the optimistic bias among investors. A reduction in
optimistic bias would then lead to further selling and further drops in prices.
A Proofs
Lemma 1
In all the four parts of Lemma 1 the proof that the requirements are necessary is
trivial. I thus prove only that the requirements are sucient:
Part 1. Let a denote some arbitrary constant payo-function. Dene p D a, and
let S D fA 2 S : p.A/ > 0g. Dene h f.A/ D
 f .A/
p.A/ for A 2 S and h f.A/ D 0
33If these assumptions were reversed, an increased likelihood of punishment would lead to increased
bias over the severity of punishment.
28for A = 2 S. For A 2 S the claim follows from the denition of h f. By Absolute
Continuity p.A/ D 0 )  f.A/ D 0, and hence the claim holds also for A = 2 S.
Part 2. Let A 2 S and x 2 X, let f .A;x/ be the payo-function mapping A to x and
all states outside A to a. Let E1;:::; En denote the other events in S. By Minimal
Complexity and Absolute Continuity S includes at least two events other than A.
f .A;x/ and the constant payo-function a agree on Ei and E j for all i and j. Hence,
by Consequentialism with E D Ei [ E j,
 f .A;x/.Ei/
 f .A;x/.E j/ D
p.Ei/
p.E j/. Thus,
1    f .A;x/.A/ D
X
i
 f .A;x/.Ei/ D
X
i
 f .A;x/.E j/
p.E j/
p.Ei/ D












. By Equation 20,
p.A/A. f .A// D .1   p.A//
 f .A; f .A//.A/
1    f .A; f .A//.A/
D p.E j/
 f .A; f .A//.A/
 f .A; f .A//.E j/
: (21)
Let f be any payo-function, and let A and B be any two events in S. Let f 0 be a
payo-function that coincides with f on A and B, and with a elsewhere, and let C be







 f 0.A/= f 0.C/




 f .A; f .A//.A/= f .A; f .A//.C/





where the rst and third steps follows from Consequentialism, and the nal step from
Equation 21. Since Equation 22 holds for all A; B 2 S it follows that Equation 5
holds for any event A 2 S. For an event A = 2 S, dene A.x/ D 1 for all x. Since
 f.A/ D p.A/ D 0 for A = 2 S Equation 5 holds however A is dened. Combining
these results Equation 5 holds for any payo-function f and any event A 2 S.
Part 3. Let A 2 S be some event. Dene the mapping  : X ! RC by .x/ D
A.x/. For x 2 X let x denote also the constant payo-function yielding the payo x
in all states. Inserting f D x and B D A in Equation 22 we obtain that for all A 2 S





.x/ . Since x is a constant payo-function it follows from
Indierence that x D a D p. Hence, A.x/ D .x/. Thus,  f.A/ / p.A/. f .A//
29for all A 2 S. Finally, this is also trivially true for A = 2 S, since  f.A/ D p.A/ D 0
for A = 2 S.
Part 4. Let A; B 2 S be two events, and let x and y be real-numbers such that x; y,
and x C y are in X. Dene the payo-functions fx and gx;y as follows: fx.s/ D x for









Hence, dening .x/ D log..x/
.0// we obtain that  is linear, i.e. for all x and y,
.x C y/ D .x/ C .y/. For m 2 N let y D mx. By induction we obtain that
.mx/ D m.x/. Similarly, for n 2 N let y D x
n to obtain that .x/ D .ny/ D n.y/,
and hence .x
n/ D .x/
n . Let y D  x to obtain that . x/ D  .x/. Combining
these results, and dening   D .1/, we obtain that for any rational number q 2 X,
.q/ D  q, and so .q/ D .0/e q. Let now x 2 X be any feasible payo-value,
and let fqngn2N be a sequence of rational feasible payo-values converging to x. By
prize-continuity  fqn !  fx, which given Equation 6 implies that .qn/ ! .x/. By
the result for rational numbers, .qn/ D .0/e qn, and hence .qn/ ! .0/e x. Thus,
.x/ and .0/e x are both the limit of the same sequence of real-numbers, and so
.x/ D .0/e x. Finally, since Equation 6 is invariant to multiplying  by a positive
number, we obtain that Equation 7 holds for all x 2 R.
Lemma 2
Proof. Let a 2 F denote some constant payo-function, and dene p D a. By
Minimal Complexity and Absolute Continuity there exists a nite partition S of the
state-space consisting of at least three events, such that  f.A/ > 0 for any f 2 F and
A 2 S. Let 6.S/  6 denote the algebra generated by S, and let F.S/  F denote
the set of 6.S/-measurable payo-functions. By Lemma 1 there exists a probability
measure pS over .S;6.S// and a parameter  S 2 R such that Equation 7 holds any
probability measure f 2 F.S/ and any event A 2 S. In particular a 2 F.S/ (any
constant payo-function is), and hence for any A 2 S, p.A/ D a.A/ / pS.A/e Sa.
Thus, p.A/ D pS for any event A 2 S, and hence also for any event A 2 6.S/. Dene
  D  S. It follows that for any payo-function f 2 6.S/ and any event A 2 S,
 f.A/ / p.A/e f .A/.34
Let now A and B denote any events such that p.B/ > 0, and let f be any
34Note that p D a is a probability measure over all the events in 6|not just the events in 6.S/.
30payo-function. I need to show that
 f .A/
 f .B/ D
p.A/
p.B/e . f .A/  f .B//. To simplify nota-
tion let  f.A; B/ D log
 f .A/
 f .B/   log
p.A/
p.B/. With this notation I need to prove that
 f.A; B/ D  . f .A/  f .B//. Let E1; E2;::: En denote the events in S. Without lim-
iting generality suppose A\E1 is not-null. Dene a payo-function g 2 F by g D f .A/
on A \ E1 and g D f .B/ elsewhere, and a payo-function h 2 F.S/ by h D f .A/
on E1 and h D f .B/ elsewhere. With these denitions,  f.A; B/ D  f.A \ E1; B/ D
g.A\ E1; B/ D g.A\ E1; B[ E2/ D g.A\ E1; E2/ D h.A\ E1; E2/ D h.E1; E2/ D
 . f .A/  f .B//, where the last step uses the fact that h is in F.S/, and the other steps
use Consequentialism and the fact that by Shift-Invariance  f .A/ D  f .B/ D p.
Corollary 1
Proof. The proof that a logit distortion is well-behaved is trivial. I thus prove only
that if  is well-behaved then it is a logit-distortion. The conditions of Lemma 2 are
met. Let p and   be parameters for which the claim in Lemma 2 holds. Suppose f
is a.e. simple then there exist a nite set of disjoint events fE1;:::; Eng such that f
is constant on each of these events, and for some payo-function g, g.[iEi/ D 1. By
Absolute Continuity also  f.[iEi/ D 1, and so  f.A\[iEi/ D  f.A/. Given that the
events are disjoint it follows that  f.A/ D
P
i  f.A \ Ei/. Using Lemma 2 we obtain
that  f.A/ /
P
i p.A \ Ei/e f .A\Ei/. By Absolute Continuity p.S n [iEi/ D 0, and
hence
R
A e f dp D
P
i p.A \ Ei/e f .A\Ei/. Combining these observations we obtain
that  f.A/ /
R
A e f dp.
Lemma 3
Proof. The case of   D 0 is trivial. Henceforth I assume   6D 0. By Corol-
lary 1 there exist a probability measure p and a parameter   such that Equation 3
holds for any payo-function f that is almost everywhere simple. If there exists
a payo-function f that is not almost everywhere simple then there exists an in-
nite sequence fAngn2N of disjoint non-null events.35 I need to prove that in this
case there exists a number M 2 R such that e x  M for all x 2 X. Suppose
35If f has innitely many atoms these atoms can form the sequence. Otherwise, let E denote
the event outside the set of atoms (if any). E cannot be null, or else f is almost always simple.
Since f has no atoms on E it follows that there exists a value y (the median of f on E) such that
p.s 2 E : f .s/  y/ D
p.E/
2 . Thus E includes two non-null events on which f has no atoms: E.y/
and E n E.y/. This process can be repeated recursively, where in the n'th stage E is split into 2n
disjoint non-null events. An innite sequence of disjoint non-null events can therefore be formed.
31otherwise, then it is possible to choose from X a sequence fxngn2N, s.t. for all n,
p.An/e xn  p.A1/e x1. Dene a payo-function f by f .An/ D xn for n 2 N,
and f .s/ D x1 outside [nAn. For n 2 N dene also a simple payo-function fn
by fn.An/ D xn and fn.s/ D x1 for s = 2 An. By construction f and fn agree on
A1 and An. Thus, for all N 2 N, 1 
P













p.A1/e x1   f.A1/
P
nN 1 D N f.A1/ where
the second equality follows from Consequentialism, and the third from Corollary 1.
Letting N ! 1 we obtain that  f.A1/ D 0, in contradiction to the assumption that
A1 is not null.
Lemma 4
Proof. By Corollary 1 there exist a probability measure p and a parameter   such
that Equation 9 holds for any payo-function f that is almost everywhere simple. I
show that the claim holds with the same p and   also for a payo-function f that
is not everywhere simple. If such payo-functions then by Lemma 3 there exists a
number M, such that e x  M for all x 2 X. Assume rst that   6D 0. For any n 2 N
divide the interval [m; M] into 2n non-overlapping intervals of length M m
2n . For any
state s let In.s/ denote the interval to which e f belongs, and let Imin
n .s/ denote its
lower endpoint. Dene a simple payo-function fn by fn.s/ D log
Imin
n .s/
  . With this
denition e f .s/   M m
2n  e fn.s/  e f .s/ for all s, and so e fn.s/ % e f .s/ for all s.











A e fn dp
R




A e fn dp
lim
R
B e fn dp
D
R
A e f dp
R
B e f dp
(23)
where the rst step follows from Prize-Continuity, the second and fourth since p.B/ >
0 and  fn.s/ 2 [m; M] on A [ B, the third from Corollary 1, and the fth from the
monotone convergence theorem.
Theorem 1
Proof. I prove that if  is a well-behaved distortion then it is a logit distortion. The
opposite direction is trivial. By Lemma 4 there exist a probability measure p and a
parameter   such that Equation 9 holds for any events A and B for which p.B/ > 0
32and any payo-function f for which there exists a number m > 0 such that e f  m
on A[ B. To complete the proof I need to show that Equation 9 holds even if no such
number m exists. Let f be any payo-function and let A and B be any events such
that p.B/ > 0. If f is almost everywhere simple the claim follows from Corollary 1.
Otherwise, by Lemma 3 there exists a number M 2 R such that e x  M for all x 2 X.
For n 2 N let An D fs 2 A : e f  2 ng, and similarly dene Bn. By construction
limn!1 A n An D ; and similarly limn!1 B n Bn D ;. Moreover, since p.B/ > 0
there exists n0 2 N such that for all n  n0, p.Bn/ > 0. The conditions for Lemma 4











An e f dp
R




An e f dp
limn!1
R
Bn e f dp
D
R
A e f dp
R
B e f dp
(24)
where step 3 holds since the integrals are bounded from below and above: (i) e x  M
for all x 2 X, so the integrals are bounded from above by M, and (ii) p.Bn0/ > 0
and f  2 n0 on Bn0, and hence there exists some m > 0 such that for all n  n0,
R
Bn e f dp 
R
Bn0
e f dp  2 n0p.Bn0/  m.
Lemma 6
Proof. Starting with A1, let f and f 0 be payo-functions and E an event, and suppose
that  f.E/ D 0. I need to prove that  f 0.E/ D 0. Let e and e0 be acts such that
f D ue and f 0 D ue0. Since  f.E/ D 0 it follows from Equation 11 that for any acts
g and h that dier only in E, Ve.g/ D Ve.h/, and so E is e-null. By B6 it follows that
E is also e0-null. Let a and b be constant acts such that a e0 b, and let g be an act
dened by g D b on E and g D a outside E. By construction a and g dier only on
E, and hence (since E is e0-null) Ve0.a/ D Ve0.g/. Using Equation 11 it follows that
 f 0.E/.u.a/   u.b// D 0. By assumption a e0 b, and hence u.a/   u.b/ > 0. Thus,
 f 0.E/ D 0 as required.
For A2 suppose f D f 0 over a non-null event E. I need to prove that for any
event A  E,  f.AjE/ D  f 0.AjE/. If  f.A/ D 0 the claim follows from A1. Suppose
therefore that  f.A/ > 0. Let e and O e be acts such that f D ue and f 0 D uO e. Dene
an act e0 by e0 D e on E and e0 D O e outside E. By construction ue0 D ue D f on
E and ue0 D uO e D f 0 outside E. By assumption f D f 0 on E and hence ue0 D f
everywhere. By B5 and B6 there exist constant acts a and a such that a e g e a for
33any g. Dene an act g by g D a on A [ Ec and g D a on E n A. For any constant
act b, dene an act gb by gb D b on E and gb D a outside E. By Equation 11,
g e gb if and only if  f.A/u.a/ C  f.E n A/u.a/   f.E/u.b/, or equivalently,
 f.AjE/u.a/ C .1    f.AjE//u.a/  u.b/. Since the set of constant acts is closed
under arbitrary mixing, there exists a constant act b such that  f.AjE/u.a/ C .1  
 f.AjE//u.a/ D u.b/, and equivalently, g e g.b/. Since e D e0 on E, and since
g and g.b/ dier only on E, it follows from B7 that also g e0 g.b/, and therefore
also  f 0.AjE/u.a/ C .1    f 0.AjE//u.a/ D u.b/. Combining these results we obtain
that  f.AjE/.u.a/   u.a// D  f 0.AjE/.u.a/   u.a//. Finally, since a e a then
u.a/ > u.a/, and so  f 0.AjE/ D  f.AjE/ as required.
For A3 suppose f 0 D f Cx for some real number x. I need to show that  f 0 D  f.
Let e and e0 be acts, such that f D ue and f 0 D ue0. By B4 and B5 there exists
constant acts a and b, such that a e b and a e g e b for any act g. Let





construction a e g e b for any act g it follows that for any s, u.a/  f .s/Cx  u.b/,
and hence f .s/   u.b/  1u   x and x  1u. Thus, 0  .s/  1 for all s. Dene
an act g by g D .1   /e C e0, let  D x
1u, and let h and h0 be acts dened by
h D .1   /g C b and h0 D .1   /g C a. With these denitions,
uh D .1   /ug C u.b/ D .1   /u..1   /e C e0/ C u.b/
D .1   /..1   / f C . f C x// C u.b/ D .1   / f C u.b/ C .1   /x











D .1   / f C u.b/ C . f   u.b// D f;
and uh0 D uh C 1u D f C x D f 0. By B8, hDh0. Hence by Lemma 5 and the
result just obtained we conclude that  f D  f 0.
For A4 suppose that fn ! f uniformly. I need to prove that for any event E and
 > 0 there exists n0 2 N such that for n > n0, j fn.E/    f.E/j < . By B5 there
exist constant acts a and b, such that a e g e b for any act g. In particular, for
any state s, there exists  : S ! [0;1] such that f D .1 /u.b/Cu.a/. Moreover,
for any n, there exists n : S ! [0;1] such that fn D .1   n/u.b/ C nu.a/.
Let e D .1   /b C a and for any n let en D .1   n/b C na. By construction,
f D ue and for any n, fn D uen. Let  > 0 be some number. Since fn ! f uniformly
there exists N > 0 such that for any n > N and for any state s, j fn.s/   f .s/j < .
34Thus, for any s, ju.e.s//   u.en.s//j < .
Let 1u D u.a/   u.b/. By construction, u.e.s//   u.en.s// D ..s/   n.s//1u.
Hence, for any n > N and any state s, j.s/ n.s/j < 
1u. In particular, for any nal
outcome z 2 Y, je.s/.z/   en.s/.z/j < 
1u. Since this is true for any  > 0 it follows
that en ! e uniformly. Hence, by B9 en! e.
Dene an act g by g.E/ D a and g.SnE/ D b. By Equation 11 for any constant
act c, c e g if and only if  f.E/  u.c/ u.b/
u.a/ u.b/. Let c be a constant act such that
g e c. Thus, for any constant act c such that u.c/ > u.c/, c e g, since en! e
for any such c then for any n large enough c en g. By Equation 11 this implies that
 fn.E/  u.c/ u.b/
u.a/ u.b/. Since this is true for any c > c it follows that for any  > 0 for
n large enough  fn.E/ <  f.E/ C . A symmetric argument can be made for c for
which u.c/ < u.c/. Combining these results we obtain that for any  > 0 for n large
enough  fn.E/ 2 [ f.E/   ; f.E/ C ], and so  fn.E/ !  f.E/ as required.
Theorem 2 (uniqueness part)
Proof. Note rst that the utility function is determined up to a positive ane trans-
formation by preferences over constant Anscombe-Aumann acts. Hence, if the triplet
.p0;u0; 0/ represents  there exists real numbers  > 0 and  such that u0 D u C.
Next, let e be any act and A any event. By B5 there exist constant acts a and b such
that a e b. Let gA be an act dened by gA D a on A and gA D b on Ac. Let cA be
a constant act dened by cA D ue.A/a C .1   ue.A//b. By Equation 10 gA e cA.
Similarly, let c0
A D u0e.A/a C .1   u0e.A//b then also gA e c0
A, and so cA e c0
A.
Since a e b it follows that u.a/ > u.b/, and hence by Equation 10 u0e.A/ D ue.A/.
Since this is true for all A it follows that for any act e, u0e D ue. I now use this
observation to show rst that p0 D p and then that  0 D
 
. First, let e be a constant
act. By Equation 3 ue D p and u0e D p0. Hence it follows from the above observa-
tion that p0 D p. Finally, by Minimal Complexity and B6 there exists an event A such
that neither A nor Ac is e null for any act e. Applying the above observation to gA





Using the corresponding equation for u0gA, the result that p0 D p, and the fact that
u0 D u C , we obtain that  .u.a/   u.b// D  0.u0.a/   u0.b// D  0.u.a/   u.b//.




35Proof. By Equation 3, 5 f.x/ /
R x
 1 h.x/dPf.x/ with h.x/ D e x. If    0, e x is





 1 h0.x/e xdPf.x/ D
R x
 1 h0.x/d5 f, and so Pf LR 5 f.
The rst part of the claim follows since stochastic dominance in the likelihood ratio
implies rst-order stochastic dominance.
Proposition 2
Proof. I prove only that lim !1  f.Amax/ D 1, as the proof that lim ! 1  f.Amin/ D
1 is very similar. Let x1 > x2 > xn denote the payos in the range of f . Thus,
Amax D f  1.x1/, and by Equation 13,
lim
 !1
 f.Amax/ 1 D lim
 !1

p. f  1.x1//e x1
P










and since xi < x1 for i > 1, the last term is zero. Hence, lim !1  f.Amax/ D 1, as
required.
Proposition 3













































22 dx D N. C a 2;2/:
Proposition 4
Proof. For any x 2 R,  f.X D xjE/ D
R
 f.X D x;Y D yjE/dy /
R
p.X D x;Y D
yjE/e f .x;y/ dy D p.X D x/
R
p.Y D yjE/e f .x;y/ dy. Hence, for any two values
xH;xL 2 R,
 f.X D xHjE/





p.Y D yjE/e f .xH;y/ dy
R
p.Y D yjE/e f .xL;y/ dy
: (25)
36Similarly,  f.X D x/ / p.X D x/
R
p.Y D y0/e f .x;y0/ dy0, and so
 f.X D xH/





p.Y D y0/e f .xH;y0/ dy0
R
p.Y D y0/e f .xL;y0/ dy0 : (26)
5XjE LR 5X (5X LR 5XjE) if and only if whenever xH  xL the expression
in Equation 25 is greater than or equal (smaller than or equal) than the expression
in Equation 26. Equivalently, if the following expression is weakly positive (weakly
negative): R
p.Y D yjE/e f .xH;y/ dy
R
p.Y D yjE/e f .xL;y/ dy
 
R
p.Y D y0/e f .xH;y0/ dy0
R
p.Y D y0/e f .xL;y0/ dy0 : (27)
Moreover, the stochastic dominance is strict if this expression is strictly positive (neg-





p.Y D yjE/p.Y D y0/

e . f .xH;y/C f .xL;y0//   e . f .xH;y0/C f .xL;y//

dy0 dy: (28)
Combining terms in which y < y0 with terms in which y > y0, the expression in






p.Y D yjE/p.Y D y0/   p.Y D y0jE/p.Y D y/






In this expression the rst term is (strictly) positive if p.EjY D y/ is (strictly) in-
creasing in y, and y is not a.e. constant. Since y > y0 and log is a strictly increasing
function, the second term has (strictly) the same sign as   if f is (strictly) supermod-
ular, and (strictly) the opposite sign if f is (strictly) submodular. The claim follows
by combining these observations.
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